This paper argues that commercial service providers and software vendors enjoy the biggest commercial benefits of the internet and therefore giving them the onus to create a secure internet seems an equitable suggestion, keenly taken on by some governments. Trusted Computing (TC) can be seen as a first response to this insight where software companies take on the responsibility for the internet infrastructure. The question remains whether the focus on cybercrime is potentially misleading, with some of the most serious legal issues for the new technology arising in the field of cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare where 'too secure' structures can hinder the efforts of the very same governments that otherwise promote online security. Anomalies and problems like these are expressions of a more fundamental paradigmatic shift of power and responsibility away from governments to the private sector, a shift that needs a much more fundamental adjustment of legal rules and regulations than commonly anticipated.
Introduction
Over the last five years, cybercrime has slowly but surely made its way to the top of the political agenda in the UK, driven by an increasing recognition that as the internet has become the medium of choice for the majority of our commercial, social and political activities and interactions, its inherent vulnerability to attack is exposing not just individual citizens, but entire economies to significant risk. The UK government recognizes the detrimental impact that a cyberattack can have on the economy and the social well being of the country (Cm7234, 2007; Cm7948, 2010) and the effect of how nations deal with internet freedom and security. Starting with an influential House of Lords report in 2007 (House of Lords Publications, 2007) , the recognition grew that nothing less may be required than a radical rethink about the way in which we approach issues such as internet governance and internet infrastructure. More recently, cybercrime remained the one field of policing that not only survived the recent raft of spending cuts, but benefited from substantial additional investment as a result of reports that quantify the loss due to cybercrime for the UK alone at £27 billion (Espiner, 2011) . The threat of cyberattacks is now classified as a 'tier one risk', next to international terrorism using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack by terrorists, a military crisis or an influenza pandemic (Cm7953, 2010) .
The internet, of course, was never intended as a platform where people spend a substantive percentage of their lives, engage in commercial activity on a large scale, work, play and socialize, and also interact in various forms as citizens with their governments. As the internet grew more and more central to our lives, the rewards for criminals exploiting its weaknesses also grew exponentially, and where at one point the main threat for the internet seemed to come from overenthusiastic teenagers designing viruses, much of it is now in the hand of highly organized criminal groups with significant resources, both in terms of expertise and computing power (Hunton, 2009) . Suspected involvement of state actors or at the very least 'rough agencies' have shown that even entire states can be subject to successful cyber attacks (Goodin, 2009) . In an ideal; world, we would start from scratch and rebuild the internet, this time with security as a design feature. But as the House of Lords' report on internet security notes, this is no longer a feasible option (House of Lords Publications, 2007, para. 3, p. 1) . Attempts to deal with the growing number of reported cybercrime incidents include instead legislation, user training, public awareness, and other technical security measures (Cm7642, 2009 ), all, with necessity, more or less workable compromises in an imperfect environment.
The question naturally arises of who should bear the main burden for protecting the unsophisticated online user making his purchase or managing his online bank account. The House of Lords' report (House of Lords Publications, 2007) identified three possible answers: rely on laws and policing by the state, with a general responsibility similar to that as exists for other critical infrastructure; make it a responsibility of the users to protect themselves; or treat it as a technological problem that is left best to software professionals in the 'enabling' industries, from PC manufacturers to ISPs.
The first option carries the problem of significant costs to the taxpayer for the benefit of a very specific segment of the economy, in effect a hidden subsidy for bad software design -akin to asking the government to invest more into building safe roads so that car manufacturers can cut corners when designing safe brakes. In addition, governments are, in their activities, tightly bound to the concept of national borders, which seriously limits their efficiency in addressing what is a global problem. Making users responsible for their own safety was traditionally, as the report notes, the preferred option by government and business alike -but, as security experts noted, an entirely unrealistic notion. The average user is lacking the technological sophistication to protect himself, and, as one respondent to the report stated, consumers were not required to purify or boil water, when the source of contamination was within the water supply infrastructure itself. Instead suppliers were required to maintain a secure network, and treated water up to exacting standards. The end-user simply had to switch on the tap to get pure, drinkable water. (House of Lords Publications, 2007, para. 3, p. 30). Finally there is the option of holding the private sector and the software industry responsible for the safety of the internet (House of Lords Publications, 2007, para. 3, p. 20) .
Internet service providers, hardware developers and software vendors enjoy the biggest commercial benefits from the internet, and are also best placed to protect the user against the most common danger due to their in-house expertise. Furthermore, many of these companies already operate globally, avoiding as a result some of the limitations that governments would inevitably face and avoiding the need of often laboriously negotiated international treatises. Therefore, putting them at the centre of the effort to create a secure internet is indeed one of the recommendations of the report, if necessary backed by legal sanctions. Releasing inherently vulnerable software and hardware to consumers, in this view, should carry the same liability a water vendor would incur for the safety of the glass bottles he uses.
For obvious reasons, this course of action would create a significant risk to technology companies. Better then to pre-empt legislation, by bringing one's house in order voluntarily. The TC initiative can be seen as a first response to this insight, with software companies and hardware developers taking on the responsibility for the internet infrastructure.
However, while technological solutions to the problem of cybercrime seem at first sight appealing, we must not forget that they operate in a specific legal environment. Law can be both a hindrance and a facilitator for technological fixes to social problems. However, whether law is 'fit for purpose' for the TC environment is underresearched, and this paper will try to flag up some of the so-far overlooked implications and problems.
We will argue that TC faces a number of anomalies and problems that are expressions of a more fundamental paradigmatic shift of power and responsibility away from governments to the private sector, a shift that needs a much more fundamental adjustment of legal rules and regulations than commonly anticipated. Furthermore, the goal of the technology companies, to pre-empt legislation that creates statutory obligations may turn out to be self-defeating, allowing them to jump out of the frying pan of specific, statutory liability, only to end in the fire of contractual and delictual (reliance) liability.
A primer in Trusted Computing
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is a non-profit corporate organization whose stated aim is 'to develop, define and promote open standards for hardware-enabled Trusted Computing and security technologies, including hardware building blocks and software interfaces, across multiple platforms, peripherals and devices' (TCG, 2010) . It was originally formed as an industry working group, by Compaq, HewlettPackard, IBM, Intel and Microsoft in January 1999 with the name Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA). From 1999 until 2003 TCPA, released a number of specifications that mainly focused in enhancing trust and security in computing platforms. In early 2001, the first specifications were released, defining the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as the fundamental component of a trusted platform.
In April 2003, TCPA was renamed TCG, adopting all the specifications released by TCPA and continuing its original development with broader horizons (Berger, 2005) and extending the invitation for other companies to join the alliance. TCG is headquartered in Portland, Oregon, but has an international membership.
Trusted Computing Group -structure
As mentioned by Berger (2005) , TCG's structure includes an open membership model, a board of directors, promoters and contributors, and a reciprocal reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) patent licensing policy among members. Thus, this structure enables the expansion and the promotion of open industry specifications. Currently, the members are divided into three main hierarchical groups: the promoters are on top -essentially the organizations that took the preliminary steps necessary for the formation of the corporation; the contributors -organizations that contribute to the corporation; and the adopters -organizations that may adopt some of the technological outcomes of the organization. The last two groups currently number more than 130 members and TCG is still inviting active member participation (TCG, 2006a (TCG, , 2006b .
Leading members (i.e. promoters) govern TCG via a board comprised of AMD, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Sony and Sun Microsystems. Members (i.e. contributors and adopters) cover a variety of companies drawn from areas such as computing, software developers, systems vendors and network and infrastructure companies.
Trusted Computing Group -aims and objectives
TCG was formed as a result of the concerns on data exposure on systems, system compromise because of software attack and lack of methods to prevent identity theft (Berger, 2005) . TC is an idea that has evolved from the need to address these issues with security solutions that will mitigate the risks and dangers; and help to increase data management and identity security. Furthermore, its aim is to protect the software and data in computer platforms (servers, desktops, laptops, PDA's, mobile phones and many more) (Proudler, 2005) from external attacks and physical theft and hopes to improve security for remote access. TC aims to add on computer hardware's functionality to 'enable entities with which the computer interacts to have some level of trust in what the system is doing' (Mitchell, 2008) . This protection is provided by implementing isolated execution environments where software and data will be protected from any meddling. Trusted platforms provide such environments and define the applications that will be permitted to operate on selected data (Proudler, 2005) . Additionally, trusted platforms can offer assurances about their behaviour both in hardware and software (Gallery, 2008) .
'Trust' is a term with many different interpretations -here the notion from the field of trusted systems will be used, according to RFC 2828 (Balacheff, Chen, Pearson, Proudler & Chan, 2000; Mitchell, 2008; Shirey, 2000) . Thus, Trusted systems are systems that can be relied upon to perform certain security policies in an expected manner and in the sense of behavioural consistency: TC 'refers to a computer system for which an entity has some level of assurance that (part or all of) the computer system is behaving as expected' (Mitchell, 2008) for a particular purpose. The outcome ultimately would be to allow the user to 'blindly trust' his computer again, without a constant need for selfmonitoring. The TCG project is pursuing the aim of allowing the computer user to trust his own computer and for 'others' to trust that specific computer (Lipson, 2002) .
Technical analysis of Trusted Computing technology

How the Trusted Platform works
Trusted Platforms (TPs) provide a technological implementation and interpretation of the factors that must be simultaneously true in order to achieve 'trust' and are defined by the TCG (TCG, 2006c):
(1) Unambiguous identity. In order for something to be able to be trustable it must be unambiguously identifiable, thus every component of a TP must be known and identifiable. (2) Unhindered operations. Something can be trusted if it behaves in an expected manner for a particular purpose. A component of a TP has been designed to perform a particular task and follow a designed behaviour. (3) Attestation. In order for something to be trusted, there must be some way of verifying consistent good behaviour of that thing. That is, for a TP to be trustworthy, there needs to be some means for that platform to report (to the external world) its integrity state (as a whole), which is a function of the integrity state of each component that make-ups that TP.
TPs are optimized for the protections and processing of private or secret data. They have isolated execution environments, where software/data is protected from external interference and they can offer assurances about their behaviour (hardware and software environment) (Gallery, 2008) .
Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol
The core of this hardware is the protocol that implements it, known as Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA). From its name we can derive the basic logic of the protocol, which implies: proof without a Trusted Third Party (TTP) involvement (Direct); non-disclosure of the identity of the signer (Anonymous); and requirement of statement or claim from a TPM (Attestation). The aims of the TCG are achieved by integrating a trusted hardware module (TPM) into a platform (e.g. a mobile phone, a laptop). Although TPM is not compulsory to be implemented in hardware, it is a de facto requirement, as software implementation is pretty much an infeasible task due to faults. A user of the platform communicates with a verifier who wants to assure that the user uses the platform containing the specified TPM. However, the user wants his privacy to be protected and therefore requires that the verifier only learns that he uses a TPM, but not which particular one.
TCG provided a solution to this problem by making use of a trusted third party which in this case was called the Privacy Certification Authority (PCA). Every TPM creates a key pair using the RSA algorithm and this key pair is called the Endorsement Key (EK). The EK is created only once and PCA keeps a record of the Endorsement Key of every valid TPM. Whenever a TPM wants to verify itself to a verifier, it creates another pair of RSA keys, which is called an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) and sends that key pair to the PCA. The PCA then authenticates this public key, which refers to the EK. Then the PCA will check if the EK is contained in its list of valid EKs. If it is contained in the list, the PCA issues to the TPM a certificate for the AIK. The TPM can now send the AIK's certificate to the verifier and actually authenticate itself. Although this is a solution for the Trusted Computing problem, it has a major disadvantage: the PCA is involved in every transaction and thus it must be highly available, but at the same time provide as much security as an ordinary certification authority, which would normally operate off-line. Moreover, if the PCA and the verifier join together, or the PCA's transaction records are revealed to the verifier -by some other means -(this can be solved by using blind signatures), the verifier will still be capable of uniquely identifying a TPM. Consequently, the problem with the PCA's availability endures.
A better solution was proposed by Ernie Brickell, Jan Camenisch and Liqun Chen. This solution was adopted by the TCG in the new specification of the TPM (1.2) in 2003. It associates techniques 'developed for group signatures, identity escrow, and credential systems' as stated in (Brickell, Camenisch & Chen, 2004) . The scheme proposed can be described as a group signature scheme, but one that does not have the opportunity to open signatures, but does have a mechanism to detect fake TPMs (Brickell, Camenisch & Chen, 2004) .
Technology/protocols on Trusted Computing
Both hardware, i.e. the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and software, i.e. the Trusted Support Services (TSS), are combined in a Trusted Computing System. The software must contain TC-enabled applications, and hardware's role is emphasized in the 'Fritz' chip. The latter is a smartcard chip -named after the Senator Fritz Hollings, a US politician with a long history of legislative attempts to ensure that PCs do not support production of 'unauthorized content' -and it is placed on the motherboard which constantly checks the software and hardware that are running on the machine. If both are found to be authorized, the operating system (OS) boots and assures any third parties that the machine is indeed the machine it is claimed to be, and the software running on it is indeed the software it is claimed to be (Anderson, 2003) .
TCG proposed a technology that makes use of four main features. Along with these, new hardware installation on existing PCs is required. The features can work individually, but can also work in conjunction with each other.
Memory curtaining
This refers to a 'strong, hardware-enforced memory isolation feature' (Schoen, 2003) in order to avoid reading and writing memory between several programs. In TC the operating system should have access to this type of memory, so if an adversary enters the operating system it would not be possible for him to enter and interfere with any program and its memory. The advantages of using a hardware feature instead of software -which could operate in a similar fashion -are the backwards compatibility; the reusability of code; and the fact that fewer changes need to be made to hardware drivers and application software (Burmester & Mulholland, 2006) .
Secure I/O
This provides a secure hardware path from the keyboard or mouse (i.e. the user) to an application and vice versa. By doing this, none of the software programs will know what the user typed as a command or input to another program and how the application responded. Protection from physical attacks is provided and any programs that intentionally 'corrupt, modify, or mislead the user, will be prevented from running or operating' (Burmester & Mulholland, 2006) .
Sealed storage
Until recently, any keys and passwords used by applications were stored locally on the hard-drive. This was not so secure, because keys could be accessible by any intruder or virus. So, it is important to ensure that only legitimate users can access these valuable and secret data. This is exactly what sealed storage does. It is characterized as 'an ingenious invention that generates keys based in part on the identity of the software requesting to use them and in part on the identity of the computer on which that software is running' (Schoen, 2003) .
Remote attestation
This aims to allow 'unauthorized' changes to software to be detected. It remotely traces any changes made to any application and allows a third party to decide whether the platform is considered trustworthy (Reid et al., 2003) . This feature is very significant and helps to prevent the sending of data to or from a compromised or untrustworthy computer and certifies that no unauthorised program installs, updates modifies the hardware or software on the user's machine. Moreover, 'this allows an entity to authenticate the software configuration of a platform that is not under its control' (Reid et al., 2003) .
The TCG chip provides three main groups of functions. These are:
(1) public key functions: which are used for key pair generation, public key signature, verification, encryption and decryption purposes; (2) trusted boot functions: which ensure that data are 'trusted', as the data stored while booting are the same as the data at the time of sealing. Trusted booting combines both authentic booting, which creates a log containing the programs that are loaded on the computing device, and secure booting, which ensures that the computing device is in a secure state. (3) initialization and management functions: which allow the user to switch on or off the functionality, to reset the chip and take ownership (Safford, 2002a) .
TCG provides protection to sensitive authentication information from attacks by hackers and this is made by protection provided to the user's private key. In addition, by sealing the master encryption key under a TCG register, it is possible to protect a user's sensitive files and data (Safford, 2002b) .
TC criticism and debate
As was to be expected, this emerging technology has raised controversies within the scientific community. The proponents of TC suggest that TC promises to provide four crucial advantages: reliability, security, privacy and business integrity. Together these guarantee a system that will be available when needed, that will resist any attack by protecting the system itself and the data, it will give the demanded privacy to the user and finally it will provide businesses with the ability to interact efficiently and safely with their customers. Additionally, TC could provide protection from viruses due to the fact that a check will be applied to all files trying to 'enter' the system as well as the implementation of new applications aiming at higher protection.
From the software vendors and content industry point of view, TC aims to provide more trustworthiness, but paradoxically, from the user point of view the outcome could be perceived as less trustworthy, with more power held by organizations that enjoy little public trust (Danidou & Schafer, 2009) .
The founder of the Free Software Foundation and creator of the GNU Project and Free Software Foundation, Richard Stallman, is one of the harshest opponents of TC. Stallman thinks that 'treacherous computing' is a more proper name for TC and he states that this technology will allow content providers and computer companies to make computers obey them. Users' data will possibly be edited and/or deleted remotely, without any notification (Stallman, 2002) . Opponents believe that restrictions will be imposed on users, as the owner of a PC will not have root access to cryptographic keys and therefore users will no longer be able to control their own machine (Green, 2002; Stallman, 2002) . This point's validity is confirmed by proponents of TC as well (Yung, 2003) , but they claim that this is a feature, not a bug, as it will restrict issues such as user override. The loss of user autonomy achieved by the lack of user access on the keys will make users trustworthy while putting trust in well designed machines, not badly educated humans.
Apart from the loss of control, TC has raised criticism about its limitations in several areas (Danidou & Schafer, 2009 ). According to Ross Anderson, TC can raise issues regarding privacy and freedom of speech, and may deter possible buyers from purchasing TC systems; or even lead to deactivation of the TCM (Anderson, 2003) . Even where deactivation and user control is a theoretical possibility provided by the system, things will not be straightforward, as then all the TC applications will not (partially or fully) function, the user's PC will not be listed as trustworthy and will not communicate in any way with other TC PCs. We get the feeling that the price of turning off TC will be too high and the choices the users will have, will be minimal.
Content sharing will also be difficult as TC will be used to monitor the playback of videos, music and other multimedia and allow it only on certain computers. Digital Rights Management (DRM), which was the original aim for developing TC technology, will be used for email, documents and multimedia, which can disappear or remain unreadable on certain computers. Critics also suggest that TC might threaten Open Source Software (OSS) development, as both OSS operating systems and applications may fail to be recognized as trustworthy by TC systems, which will then refuse to run them. In addition, programs that use TC when installed will be able to continually download new authorization rules through the Internet and impose those rules automatically. In such circumstances, it is claimed that computers may apply the new instructions downloaded, without notification to the user, to such a degree that a user will no longer be able to fully interact with his or her own computer (Anderson, 2003; Stallman, 2002) .
Some researchers object to these accusations and state that indeed TC will control which software will interoperate on the TC platform, but it will not restrict which OS the computer can run on, which software will be installed and used, and it will not need approval mechanisms for OSS or applications. 'TC [. . .] can work perfectly well with any OS and any application, whether open source or proprietary' (Felten, 2003; Proudler, 2005) . Hence, software vendors as well as content providers will have more power on the user's computer.
Legal responsibility in an age of TC
A key argument of this paper is that while TC aims to eventually provide a more secure and trustworthy technological solution for the benefit of the user, the price is a massive shift of power to the software providers. Unless a computer is TC certified, its usability will be severely hampered. Customer choice of software, especially OSS, will as a result be curtailed. The TC provider will also have unprecedented access to the user's hard drives, and the ability not only to extract information, but also to reconfigure the software. With such great powers, great responsibility should come, with a role for the law to address the above-mentioned ethical concerns and rebalance the interplay of power and responsibility. In short, governments (and citizens) should accept this power shift and its consequences only if a corresponding increase of responsibility occurs on the side of the TC provider.
Conceptually, the TC approach amounts to a part privatization of what is, in the online world, a core state function. Safety becomes a commodity, and its exchange is primarily governed by contract. This of course is not something entirely newcustomers already 'buy' safety offline and online, through private security firms or safety locks offline, and through products such as firewalls and anti-virus software online. For these traditional countermeasures, the operation of efficient free markets justified a cautious approach when imposing liability, giving the providers a large free reign to compete not just on issues of reliability and security, but also on the degree in which they offer guarantees and compensation. Users can choose between a variety of competing products or none at all if they conclude that the costs of protection outweigh the risks of an attack. Their computer remains fully operational and capable of interacting with the internet regardless of their choice. If they suffer harm from a cheap product, or by refusing any protection, the loss lies entirely on them. On the other side of the coin, most if not all antivirus software producers make it clear that their system increases safety, but cannot entirely prevent threats, and exclude liability unless required by law -unless the provider is proven to have acted gross negligently, letting through a new virus will not normally create liability for him. It is however precisely this element of choice and user control that has resulted in the undesirable situation in which we find ourselves. Too many users do not update their protection regularly, or decide not to protect themselves at all. While this would be tolerable if indeed they only harmed themselves -we do not after all make security locks for our houses compulsory -the nature of online threats means that such an individual poses not just a danger to himself, but also to others. Infected computers are the main element of a bot-net, which in turn enables the type of large scale Denial of Service (DoS) attack that threatens the very existence of the net (Bayer, Habibi, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2009) .
From a legal perspective, one possibility would be to impose in these situations liability for the harm that ensues. If I leave my computer vulnerable, and it is later used in a crime, I too have to accept some of the blame and the liability, just as a person might find themselves liable when they leave a gun in easy reach of children. However, for practical, conceptual and procedural reasons, this is not really an option. The affected user whose computer is zombified will regularly lack the relevant intent (since, as the House of Lords notices, protecting yourself against the latest threats requires skills simply not available to many), his computer taken in isolation will have played only a marginal role in the attack, making it difficult to prove causality, and he also won't have the financial means to compensate for a large-scale attack. The TC philosophy instead takes the responsibility away from him entirely and passes it on to the software and hardware producers. However, in this new reality, not buying the product stops being an option, if not for legal, then practical reasons: unless seen as trustworthy by other machines, the computer will no longer be able to communicate with them, or communicate fully. It is at this point possible to push the 'virus' analogy a bit further. TC is similar to a mandatory vaccination program, where 'herd immunity' is achieved at the expense of individual choice. Many jurisdictions have rules that permit exactly this type of trade-off in situations of great societal risk (Colgrove & Bayer, 2005) and, as we noted above, it is not by coincidence that the UK groups large-scale DoS attacks together with the danger of a pandemic, as a tier one security risk.
However, what is questionable is if under these conditions, the free market argument that justifies exclusion of liability through contractual terms is still valid. Faced with what is essentially a legally sanctioned monopoly (in itself a problem for competition law that will need addressing), users lose the possibility to choose to defend themselves. The imbalance of negotiation power that this creates, means de facto compulsion to buy TC products. Given the monopoly position of the TC consortium and this de facto compulsion, liability exclusion clauses may well violate good faith requirements. As long as TC does what it is supposed to do and protect the user, this is not an issue. However, we have reasons to doubt that even TC will be a bulletproof solution. One reason is simply the observation that new security technologies are simply one more step in a technological arms race, where 'evolutionary pressures' are more likely than not to result over time in new, and as yet unanticipated, attack tools.
Another problem is more systemic. Is it even desirable that TC delivers total security from attacks? This question seems nonsensical unless we realize that the entire field of internet security is based on a fundamental paradox: what works for the victim also works for the criminal, and what works for the criminal can also work for the police. This was epitomized in the debate around secure encryption in the late 1990s: while strong encryption protects honest citizen against ID thieves and other fraudsters by protecting sensitive communication such as bank details, it also protects criminals organizing their activity, their clandestine communications and online money laundering activities (Friedman, 1996; Hopt, 1987) . Complex compromise solutions had to be designed, which typically combine restrictions on some technologies with legal requirements to hand over keys as part of an investigation (Barth & Smith, 1997) .
Conversely, some investigative methods by police use the very same technologies that criminal hackers use to exploit computer vulnerabilities. In Germany, the 'Federal Trojan' was a piece of software that opened backdoors in the computers of crime suspects, to permit clandestine monitoring of their activities (Abel & Schafer, 2009) . Even more controversially, the recent attack on Iran's computer infrastructure for the nuclear industry was very likely the result of actions by a 'friendly' state power (friendly, that is, to the US and UK as main sponsors of TC) using a similar, Trojan-based approach (Falliere, Murchu, & Chien, 2011) . A technological solution such as TC that can't distinguish in principle between good 'governmental' Trojans and bad 'criminal' Trojans and prevents both from functioning, creates potential for conflicts, both technological and legal, that need to be further explored. Neither is it an option any longer to provide the public with a 'weak' form of TC that remains vulnerable to attackers if and only if these have the computational resources of state powers, one of the options in the older encryption debate.
As we indicated above, organized criminals, often with a background in the disintegrating security agencies of the Eastern block, can match those of official agencies. More plausible is the idea that the state will impose a requirement to leave sufficient weak spots so that when authorized by a court, the TC provider himself is in a position to access the data. This is very similar to the provision of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) in the UK that creates obligations to hand over encryption keys. In such an environment, TC providers face a stark choice: promise a lot, and risk liability when things fail, or make it clear in the contract that TC too cannot guarantee safety -which would risk to undermine acceptance and take-up by the public (after all, TC also permits companies to scrutinize one's hard drive for illegally downloaded music tracks, and even an honest user will want something significant in return for granting a private sector company such snooping powers) while still facing the risk that clauses excluding liability are deemed in violation of good faith principles. A survey-based study by the authors, indicates that there is little awareness on the side of the TC providers at present about the potential legal issues and pitfalls that even the mere appearance of selling a failsafe, totally trustworthy system can generate. The assumption seems to be that liability exclusion clauses, similar to those used by anti-virus software providers, will remain acceptable, a position we think is untenable (Danidou, 2006) . Moreover, the legal risks for TC developers do not stop here. We argued above that one of the main benefits of TC does not accrue just with the user who is contractually linked to the TC provider. Rather, the ultimate aim is 'herd immunity', something that also benefits third parties. TC flags up my computer as trustworthy towards others. The other computers then are programmed to trust me and engage with me. But what happens if, due to a mistake, a non-trustworthy machine is certified as trustworthy, a third party engages with it and suffers as a result a loss? To use again the medical analogy: when working in certain industries, e.g. when handling food, employees may require a health certificate. If a duly constituted authority takes on the legal duty of certification, but allows accidentally an infected person to serve food, this may create liability towards all those third parties who ate the food and were as a result infected. In cases such as this, legal systems can and often do impose liability outside the contractual nexus, and for the benefit of the third parties that suffered the harm. This type of delictual 'reliance liability' has, for instance, been discussed in the context of engineers certifying an aircraft as airworthy, or even for employers writing overly generous references for an employee who subsequently gains a position for which he is ill qualified (Allen, 1995; Honsell, 1999) .
While more common in civilian jurisdictions, common law countries too permit quasi-contracts for the benefit of third parties based on protection of a reasonable expectation of trustworthiness (Scho¨nenberger, 1999) . Typically, this happens in the field of expert statements, where the expert has knowledge that the layperson who relies on his judgment cannot possible have (Schneider, 1999 ) -and as we saw above, this limitation of expertise available to laypeople to protect themselves, is one of the motivators of the TC approach. In this analysis, TC sees a massive shift of power away from ignorant laypeople to highly informed computer developers, not just for the benefit of their own customers but for the entire internet infrastructure. This power shift takes away choice from consumers to look after their own safety, and also subjects them potentially to significant intrusion and surveillance by their 'protectors'.
To rebalance this situation, we argue that the imposition of reliance liability follows from general principles of delict law, and has indeed been imposed in cases where the third-party warranty carried much less authority, and left the recipient much more room to either accept or reject the recommendation than TC will allow. Again, we can see how this reinforces the general paradox of TC (and all similar solutions that may emerge in the future). As users lose (some) control over their computer, they have to rely to a much greater extent on the correctness of the software protocols and security algorithms. They are forced to trust the system and will therefore rightly expect recourse when the software fails. The more efficient the TC, the greater this reasonable expectation by third parties is going to be, and the greater the pressure on the legal system to permit legal action for damages even outside the contractual nexus between vendor and customer. This delictual liability, if it were to be recognized by the courts, would in turn give a disincentive for software producers to be 'too good' at securing the internet. Instead, they would remind third parties constantly that even a 'TC secure' system cannot always be trusted. The economic imperative for this will be strong. TC providers may hope to manage their legal risk and their exposure to damage claims vis-a`-vis their own customers through appropriately drafted contracts. Their liability towards third parties however can't be controlled in this way.
From a legal perspective, TC could become a victim of its own success, unless legal privileges that ensure (third party) indemnity are granted. But these in turn would undermine the legitimacy of the power shift from consumer to software provider, with consumers rightly feeling hard done by (and possibly unwilling to use the technology) if they were, on the one hand, forced to use a system, and on the other unable to get recourse in case of damages. If I fail to check if the online buyer I interact with is honest, I may 'deserve' to be ripped off, but if I'm forced to use a specific supplier by the concerted action of the state and private sector, I will rightly demand protection. Gunther Teubner has emphasized the importance of reliance liability in networks and the networked society, especially when, as on the internet, private and public forms of governance are impossible to separate (Teubner, 2002) . While TC is not one of the examples he discusses, it seems to us that it is a paradigmatic case for his approach, which sees reliance liability as a main legal ingredient for the generation of the social capital of trust in networked societies (Teubner, 2003) .
There is, however, a parallel line of argumentation that may be worth exploring in this context. We argued above that with TC the private sector takes on quasi public functions to guarantee the security of the internet. State liability for voluntary undertakings towards individuals is of course a highly contested issue. If police officers fail to protect me from criminals, do I have recourse in delict? Does it matter if the very same officers had previously confiscated my gun, preventing me from defending myself? TC comes close to this second scenario. Legal systems vary in the degree in which they protect the police against such claims through specifically created privileges. It will have to be left for another paper to see how this approach plays out in the TC environment. Is the rationale for limiting liability for police officers who fail to protect a third party sound, and if so, are the similarities between TC and policing sufficiently strong to apply the same exemption analogously? Or conversely, are those countries that increasingly permit delictual actions against the police under these circumstances correct, is the erosion of state immunity conceptually sound, and if so, does it too permit analogous application to TC? (Pellicciotti, 1989) As indicated above, the picture is further complicated by situations where the state, in one form or the other, may feel compelled to compromise the integrity of a computer system. This could be as part of a military or quasi-military action, or, as in the case of the German 'Federal Trojan', as part of a police investigation . This could create a further responsibility for the TC developers -the willingness to compromise their own product under certain circumstances. This in turn, would require a set of legal instruments, on the one hand, to compel them to cooperate, and on the other a qualified privilege for harm that comes from such a request. Hence, balancing the legal obligations, privileges, immunities and burdens in a way that is at the same time equitable to consumers and software vendors requires considerably more complex responses by the law than the simply increase in contractual liability that the House of Lords envisaged.
Conclusions
Internet security has gained the interest that it deserves from a governmental point of view (Cm7948, 2010; Downing, 2011; Intellect, 2010) . Consumers need to be confident in internet security as well, to invest in and on it, and thus allow digital economies to prosper. TC proposes a technical solution, where security is neither entrusted to the user, nor enforced by the state, but is found in every unit of the internet. This paper argues that a dramatic shift of power away from consumers and state regulatory bodies to the software providers is observed, and will only be acceptable if it is accompanied by an equivalent shift in legal responsibility. While the House of Lords is right in its emphasis of the responsibility of software and hardware producers, it may have underestimated the amount of adjustments in the legal regime that this requires, as have -so it seems to us -the TC developers.
